Scientific consensus on the COVID-19 pandemic: we need to act now by Alwan, Nisreen A et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Alwan, NA, Burgess, RA, Ashworth, S, Beale, R, Bhadelia, N, Bogaert, D, Dowd, J, Eckerle, I, Goldman, LR,
Greenhalgh, T, Gurdasani, D, Hamdy, A, Hanage, WP, Hodcroft, EB, Hyde, Z, Kellam, P, Kelly-Irving, M,
Krammer, F, Lipsitch, M, McNally, A, McKee, M, Nouri, A, Pimenta, D, Priesemann, V, Rutter, H, Silver, J,
Sridhar, D, Swanton, C, Walensky, RP, Yamey, G & Ziauddeen, H 2020, 'Scientific consensus on the COVID-19













If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Jun. 2021
Scientific consensus on the COVID-19 pandemic: we need to act now 
 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has infected more than 35 
million people glob ally, with more than 1 million deaths recorded by WHO as of Oct 12, 
2020. As a second wave of COVID-19 affects Europe, and with winter approaching, we need 
clear communication about the risks posed by COVID-19 and effective strategies to combat 
them. Here, we share our view of the current evidence-based consensus on COVID-19. 
SARS-CoV-2 spreads through contact (via larger droplets and aerosols), and longer-range 
transmission via aerosols, especially in conditions where ventilation is poor. Its high 
infectivity, 1 combined with the susceptibility of unexposed populations to a new virus, 
creates conditions for rapid community spread. The infection fatality rate of COVID-19 is 
several-fold higher than that of seasonal influenza, 2 and infection can lead to persisting 
illness, including in young, previously healthy people (so-called long COVID). 3 It is unclear 
how long protective immunity lasts,4  and, like other seasonal coronaviruses, SARS-CoV-2 is 
capable of re-infecting people who have already had the disease, but the frequency of 
reinfection is unknown. 5 Transmission of the virus can be mitigated through physical 
distancing, use of face coverings, hand and respiratory hygiene, and by avoiding crowds and 
poorly ventilated spaces. Rapid testing, contact tracing, and isolation are also critical to 
controlling transmission. WHO has been advocating for these measures since early in the 
pandemic. In the initial phase of the pandemic, many countries instituted lockdowns 
(general population restrictions, including orders to stay at home and work from home) to 
slow the rapid spread of the virus. This was essential to reduce mortality,6,7  prevent 
health-care services from being overwhelmed, and buy time to set up pandemic response 
systems to suppress transmission following lockdown. Although lockdowns have been 
disruptive, substantially affecting mental and physical health, and harming the economy, 
these effects have often been worse in countries that were not able to use the time during 
and after lockdown to establish effective pandemic control systems. In the absence of 
adequate provisions to manage the pandemic and its societal impacts, these countries have 
faced continuing restrictions. 
 
This has understandably led to widespread demoralisation and diminishing trust. The arrival 
of a second wave and the realisation of the challenges ahead has led to renewed interest in 
a so-called herd immunity approach, which suggests allowing a large uncontrolled outbreak 
in the low-risk population while protecting the vulnerable. Proponents suggest this would 
lead to the development of infection-acquired population immunity in the low-risk 
population, which will eventually protect the vulnerable. 
 
This is a dangerous fallacy unsupported by scientific evidence. 
 
Any pandemic management strategy relying upon immunity from natural infections for 
COVID-19 is flawed. Uncontrolled transmission in younger people risks significant morbidity 
3 and mortality across the whole population. In addition to the human cost, this would 
impact the workforce as a whole and overwhelm the ability of healthcare systems to 
provide acute and routine care. Furthermore, there is no evidence for lasting protective 
immunity to SARS-CoV-2 following natural infection, 4 and the endemic transmission that 
would be the consequence of waning immunity would present a risk to vulnerable 
populations for the indefinite future. Such a strategy would not end the 
 
COVID-19 pandemic but result in recurrent epidemics, as was the case with numerous 
infectious diseases before the advent of vaccination. It would also place an unacceptable 
burden on the economy and healthcare workers, many of whom have died from COVID-19 
or experienced trauma as a result of having to practise disaster medicine. Additionally, we 
still do not understand who might suffer from long COVID. 3 Defining who is vulnerable is 
complex, but even if we consider those at risk of severe illness, the proportion of vulnerable 
people constitute as much as 30% of the population in some regions.8  Prolonged isolation 
of large swathes of the population is practically impossible and highly unethical. Empirical 
evidence from many countries shows that it is not feasible to restrict uncontrolled 
outbreaks to particular sections of society. Such an approach also risks further exacerbating 
the socioeconomic inequities and structural discriminations already laid bare by the 
pandemic. Special efforts to protect the most vulnerable are essential but must go hand-in-
hand with multi-pronged population-level strategies. 
 
Once again, we face rapidly accelerating increase in COVID-19 cases across much of Europe, 
the USA, and many other countries across the world. It is critical to act decisively and 
urgently. Effective measures that suppress and control transmission need to be 
implemented widely, and they must be supported by financial and social programmes that 
encourage community responses and address the inequities that have been amplified by the 
pandemic. Continuing restrictions will probably be required in the short term, to reduce 
transmission and fix ineffective pandemic response systems, in order to prevent future 
lockdowns. The purpose of these restrictions is to effectively suppress SARS-CoV-2 
infections to low levels that allow rapid detection of localised outbreaks and rapid response 
through efficient and comprehensive find, test, trace, isolate, and support systems so life 
can return to near-normal without the need for generalised restrictions. Protecting our 
economies is inextricably tied to controlling COVID-19. We must protect our workforce and 
avoid long-term uncertainty. 
 
Japan, Vietnam, and New Zealand, to name a few countries, have shown that robust public 
health responses can control transmission, allowing life to return to near-normal, and there 
are many such success stories. The evidence is very clear: controlling community spread of 
COVID-19 is the best way to protect our societies and economies until safe and effective 
vaccines and therapeutics arrive within the coming months. We cannot afford distractions 
that undermine an effective response; it is essential that we act urgently based on the 
evidence. 
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